Immigration and Refugees Law
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Assuming “Sign” means Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177 [Singh]: its connection to Bill C-12 is that excluding a claim from the RPD does not remove the need for a fair process to assess protection risk before removal. But Singh does not guarantee every claimant an RPD hearing, a PRRA hearing, or an appeal. A PRRA may be an alternative route to protection; Federal Court review is an important way to challenge legal or procedural errors, but it is not a new merits hearing and does not automatically stop removal.
Bill C-12 is the Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act, SC 2026, c 4 [C-12 Act]. The Act identifies Part 8 as dealing with IRPA ineligibility and includes a later reporting provision referring to IRPA paragraph 101(1)(b.1):
At the start of the fifth year after the day on which this Part comes into force, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration must prepare a report in respect of the application of paragraph 101(1)(b.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
The Act extract available for this research records royal assent on March 26, 2026, but replaces sections 73–74 with “[Amendments]” and does not establish Part 8’s commencement date. So I cannot verify from that extract the exact C-12 amendments or when they took effect. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], text retrieved here does set out these ineligibility grounds:
(b.1) the claimant entered Canada after June 24, 2020 and made the claim more than one year after the day of their entry;
(b.2) the claimant entered Canada at a location along the Canada–United States land border — including the waters along or across that border — that is not a port of entry and made the claim after the end of the time limit referred to in subsection 159.4(1.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations;
Those clauses illustrate how an eligibility rule can prevent referral to the RPD. The second clause depends on a regulatory time limit; I cannot verify its exact duration from the materials retrieved. The IRPA extract also lacks a consolidation date, so the precise wording and in-force status should be checked against the official law applicable to the person’s claim date.
The Supreme Court’s concern in Singh was whether the refugee-determination procedure gave claimants fundamental justice—not whether every claimant must use one particular tribunal:
I am accordingly of the view that the procedures for determination of refugee status claims as set out in the Immigration Act, 1976 do not accord refugee claimants fundamental justice in the adjudication of those claims and are thus incompatible with s. 7 of the Charter.
(Singh.)
The Court also cautioned against reading its decision as requiring an oral hearing in every case:
Thus it is possible that an oral hearing before the decision-maker is not required in every case in which s. 7 of the Charter is called into play.
(Singh.)
Under the IRPA text retrieved here, a person subject to a removal order in force may apply for a PRRA, subject to statutory exclusions and other requirements. This is an application they must make; it is not an automatic transfer to the RPD:
A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1).
(IRPA, s 112(1).)
PRRA is not available to everyone found ineligible for RPD referral. For example, the Act bars an application where the claim was found ineligible under paragraph 101(1)(e), the designated-country ground. The IRPA also contains other restrictions. And the specific mandatory PRRA hearing in s. 113.01 is limited to a person whose claim was found ineligible solely under s. 101(1)(c.1), the information-sharing ground; the provision does not say that every ineligible claimant must receive that hearing.
In Seklani v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2020 FC 778 [Seklani], the Federal Court addressed that information-sharing category and explained the distinction between an RPD bar and the protection required before removal:
Section 7 of the Charter does not require a particular type of process and does not give a positive right to refugee protection. Section 7 protects against removal to a place where an individual would face a substantial risk of death, torture, or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. As such, a bar from the RPD does not engage section 7 rights, even if Mr. Seklani is not otherwise inadmissible to Canada or excluded from refugee protection. Section 7 instead requires a fair process having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the interests at stake.
(Seklani at para 52.)
That decision does not amount to blanket approval of every PRRA procedure for every new ineligibility ground. It says whether a particular PRRA process supplies the required safeguards must be assessed in its factual context. The Court also explained that a serious credibility issue may require an oral hearing, while the specific mandatory hearing under s. 113.01 applies to the s. 101(1)(c.1) category.
When an officer finds a claim ineligible, or a PRRA officer later refuses protection, Federal Court judicial review can test whether the decision was legally or procedurally defective. Under IRPA s. 72, review requires leave, and an application concerning a matter arising in Canada generally must be filed and served within 15 days after the person is notified of, or becomes aware of, the decision. An extension is possible only for special reasons:
Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised — under this Act is, subject to section 86.1, commenced by making an application for leave to the Court.
The application shall be filed … within 15 days, in the case of a matter arising in Canada, or within 60 days, in the case of a matter arising outside Canada, after the day on which the applicant is notified of or otherwise becomes aware of the matter.
A judge of the Court may, for special reasons, allow an extended time for filing and serving the application or notice.
(IRPA, s 72(1), (2)(b)–(c).)
Judicial review is not the same as an appeal or a second refugee hearing. The Federal Court of Appeal explained that, unlike an appeal available as of right, Federal Court review depends on leave and is confined to the record:
Access to the RAD is as of right, whereas access to the Federal Court is dependent on leave … Judicial review in the Federal Court is confined to the record.
(Kreishan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 223 at para 45.)
Review can still be consequential. In Szalai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 972 [Szalai], the Court found that a PRRA officer had wrongly treated an earlier RPD finding as something the claimant had to overcome, despite new evidence about later circumstances. The Court set aside the PRRA refusal and returned the matter for reconsideration by a different officer:
By factoring the RPD’s finding on state protection into her analysis as she did, the officer committed a reviewable error. As a result, her decision cannot stand.
The application for judicial review … is allowed, the decision is set aside, and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a different immigration officer.
(Szalai at paras 38–39.)
There is a separate urgency issue: filing for judicial review of a refused PRRA does not, by itself, guarantee that removal will stop. In Mida v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 607 [Mida], the Court held that the statutory stays it considered did not include applications for leave challenging a negative PRRA:
Parliament has only envisioned statutory stays in certain specified circumstances related to PRRAs … none of which included applications for leave challenging negative PRRA decisions.
(Mida at para 25.)
The IRPA says a removal order is enforceable if it is in force and not stayed (s. 48(1)). A person facing imminent removal may therefore need to seek a separate court-ordered stay while the leave and judicial-review process is pending. That stay is not automatic or guaranteed; Mida describes the test as requiring a serious issue, irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favouring a stay (at para 10).
In short, Singh supplies the fundamental-justice principle, not an automatic right to RPD referral or appeal. If an ineligibility decision leaves PRRA as the available protection process, leave and judicial review are practically important safeguards against legal or procedural error. They must be pursued promptly, and a separate stay may be needed if removal is imminent.
The information presented is for informational and educational purposes only and may not be accurate. This information does not replace getting legal advice from a qualified, practicing lawyer. If you are facing a legal dilemma, you should make an appointment and consult with one of our licensed and practicing lawyers.
دریافت نامه ۳۰ روزه از IRCC درباره عضویت در سپاه پاسداران میتواند پیامدهای جدی مهاجرتی داشته باشد. این مقاله به معیار قانونی عضویت، اهمیت اجبار در خدمت، مدارک لازم و اقداماتی که وکیل میتواند در مهلت پاسخ انجام دهد میپردازد.
An IRGC-related procedural fairness letter can raise difficult questions about membership, compulsory military service, duress and security inadmissibility. This article examines the legal authorities and evidence-related steps discussed in the supplied text.
An examination of Bill C-12 and refugee claim ineligibility under the IRPA. Discover why the historic Singh ruling does not guarantee an oral hearing or RPD access, how statutory bars impact PRRA, and the strict rules governing judicial review and removal stays.
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